













There is much to admire in Earp et al’s analysis of anti-love biotechnology. The topic is an interesting one; their use of Fisher’s “lust-attraction-attachment” model provides a useful heuristic for thinking about the different types of anti-love intervention; and the preliminary ethical framework that they sketch offers guidance on the permissible use of such technologies. Nevertheless, in the spirit of constructive dialogue, I wish to probe certain aspects of their proposed ethical framework and question its overall utility. Does it provide a useful guide for deciding when and whether anti-love technologies are to be used? Or is it overly narrow and poorly structured? I shall argue for the latter, and suggest possible modifications.

	The proposed ethical framework consists of four conditions (Earp et al, 2013, 16ff). They can be summarised as follows:

The use of anti-love biotechnologies by S is permissible if (but not only if)​[2]​ the following conditions are met:

(a) The love experienced by S is clearly harmful and needs to dissolve (the harm condition);

(b) S wants to use the technology (the consent condition);

(c) the technology would help S to follow their higher order goals instead of their lower order feelings (the autonomy-enhancing condition);

(d) it might not be psychologically possible for S to overcome the perilous feelings without the help of the technology (the necessity condition).

The necessity condition is problematic, as the authors themselves acknowledge (Earp et al, 2013, 21-22; see also Douglas, 2013, for similar arguments about moral enhancement technologies). But other aspects of the framework are problematic too. As I hope to make clear, the framework as a whole -- and the autonomy-enhancing condition in particular -- tend toward the vice of in-principlism; a vice that is all-too common in debates about the ethics of enhancement. Furthermore, if we take Earp et al’s analysis seriously, the harm condition is redundant in its current form.


The Vice of In-Principlism
Ethical debate about the merits of human enhancement is not always as productive as it can be. As Buchanan points out, there is tendency among the participants to endlessly re-hash the pros and cons of enhancement in general, and to eschew the provision of “policy proposals for coping with the challenges of enhancement that are definite enough to be of some practical use” (Buchanan, 2011, 244). Others have echoed this complaint, suggesting that the debate gets caught up in a “bubble” of excitement about potential technologies, and fails to pay serious attention to the risks and rewards associated with the technologies that are currently available (Lucke et al, 2011; Partridge, 2013; Boot et al, 2011).

	What these authors highlight is something I call the “vice of in-principlism”. This arises when we debate the following kind of question:

Q. Suppose we had a technology with features X, Y, and Z. In principle, would it be good/bad or right/wrong to use such a technology?

Now to be clear, I am not suggesting that questions of this sort are always inappropriate or always vicious: they can be, and often are, used beneficially to explore many important issues. What I do want to suggest, however, is that in debates about enhancement they have, dare I say it, reached the limit of their utility. This is because questions of this sort exhibit two independent, but related vices. First, they lead us to ignore or downplay the ethical questions associated with current technologies. Second, and more subtly, by focusing on possible enhancement technologies with features “X, Y and Z”, they cause us to gloss over the likely positive and negative qualities of future tech. This is because the proposer of the question typically has a bias in the pro or anti-enhancement direction. Thus, the former tend to over-emphasise possible positive features; the latter tend to over-emphasise possible negative features.

	Earp et al’s discussion of anti-love technology exhibits the vice of in-principlism in a number of respects. Most obviously, it exhibits it in the strange disconnect between the first and second halves of their article. The first half, which provides the model for thinking about possible interventions, discusses several extant interventions. These interventions could be, and indeed already are being, used to disrupt the mechanisms of lust and attraction,​[3]​ albeit in a blunt, side-effect riddled fashion. It is strange then, that when we are presented with the ethical framework we get no real discussion of the permissible use of these extant technologies. Instead, we are presented with a best case scenario and a list of conditions prescribing when anti-love interventions could, in principle, be permissible. One would have thought some consideration of current technologies was in order at this point. Can SSRIs be prescribed to blunt the emotional attachment of the abused housewife if she really wants it? We are not told. Of course, this disconnect doesn’t undermine the four conditions set out in the framework. It could be that those conditions are entirely appropriate and we simply don’t have any technologies to that can meet the requirements set out therein.

	Still, I think that in developing the autonomy-enhancing condition the authors exhibit a tunnel-vision that is common among in-principlists. They suggest that if, in principle, the technology allows someone to pursue their higher-order goals, and not their lower order feelings, it may be permissible for them to use it. The problem with this is twofold. First, it ignores some practical, “in reality”, difficulties with identifying and determining higher-order goals. Second, and more importantly, specifying the condition in this manner draws attention towards the positive aspects of possible technologies and away from side effects that such technologies are likely to have. If we have an anti-love drug that disrupts the attachment mechanism completely, or disrupts the lust mechanisms at the same time, is it covered by this condition? Such an important question is glossed over because of the vice of in-principlism.

	Others have made similar complaints. In a footnote Earp et al (2013, fn 20) mention an anonymous reviewer who highlighted a range of ethical issues that might be associated such technologies but which were not covered by their framework. They responded by saying that they were narrowly focused on the topic of permissibility, and not with the entire ethical landscape of biotechnology. This is fair cop: one cannot expect every cost and benefit to be weighed up in one paper. But by ignoring some of the current and probable side effects they present us with an ethical framework of limited practical utility, even if our concern is narrowly with permissible use. I think we can, and should, do better when debating the ethics of enhancement.

The Harmfulness of Love
There is also a problem with their harm condition. In its current form, the framework demands that the love be harmful to the person seeking to use the anti-love technology. This is an appealing stipulation - we are much more likely to support the use of anti-love technologies in such cases because we are intuitively repulsed by harmful love. But beyond this rhetorical appeal, I think it is clear that the harm condition plays no serious role in the proposed framework. The consent condition does all the heavy lifting. For if the harm condition is to have any independent significance, then harm must be determined according to some objective standard; if it is simply understood as whatever the subject (S) really really doesn’t want, then it collapses into the consent condition. All that matters is that we respect the subject’s wishes.

	That the harm condition exhibits this collapsibility is clear when we consider two aspects of Earp et al’s analysis. First, in their initial discussion of harm, although they allude to the possibility of a subject-independent assessment of harmfulness, and the attendant possibility of paternalistic anti-love interventions, they backtrack by pointing to the risk of paternalistic overreach. As they put it “the potential for even a “soft” paternalistic overreach seems fairly substantial: in general, people should be quite cautious about assuming that they know better than someone else what is in her own best interests, all things considered” (2013, 18). This pushes all the weight onto the subject’s assessment of their interests. Secondly, in their discussion of homosexuality and other forms of cultural sexual taboo, the authors completely abandon their reliance on the harm condition. Although they themselves have no objection to homosexual practice, and although they think the oppressive cultural enforcement of sexual norms is something to be opposed, they accept that under the right conditions someone should be allowed to use anti-love technologies to alter their sexual preferences. This is because we must “respect the autonomous decision of each individual to engage in her own process of “becoming” who and what she seeks to be, in accordance with her personal goals and values” (Earp et al, 2013, 24). I quite agree, but then the harm condition becomes redundant and the consent condition needs to be modified so as to specify the conditions under which someone’s judgment about what they really want will be respected.

	This is not to say that harm is irrelevant to any proposed ethical framework. Far from it. But if it is relevant I suspect it is relevant in a different way, one that is not explored much by Earp et al. If we are arguing from liberal-democratic principles, the fact that harm-to-self is not part of our ethical framework should not be too surprising. But the fact that harm to others is not part of our framework should be. There are, after all, forms of lust, attraction and attachment that are harmful to other people. One thinks of stalkers, harassers, paedophiles and so on.​[4]​ If anti-love interventions are to be used, then these people are obvious targets. In those cases, however, we can’t rely on consent to justify the intervention, just as we can’t rely on consent to justify imprisonment or other forms of punishment.
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^1	  * PhD (University College Cork, Ireland); Lecturer in Law, Keele University, School of Law
^2	  Earp et al’s stated goal (2013, 16-17) is to analyse a best case scenario for intervention, then proceed from their to more problematic cases. Hence, their framework is not intended to identify the only circumstances in which interventions are permissible; just the most obvious ones. 
^3	  Disruption of the attachment mechanism is less readily available at the moment, as Earp et al point out.
^4	  Earp et al are, of course, aware of these examples, which makes it all the more puzzling that they don’t address them in their proposed ethical framework.
